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P AT E N T S
YEARS

The changing life science patent landscape
Arti K Rai & Jacob S Sherkow
What have we learned from 20 tumultuous years of patent law in the life sciences? Is patenting likely to be as
important for the industry in the future?
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ver the past two decades, patent law in the
life sciences has been buffeted by numerous controversies. With courts, legislatures and
patent offices all responding, one could be forgiven for believing that the main constant has
been change. In the following article, we look
back at some of the major events in life science intellectual property (IP) law and business
practice over the past 20 years and then suggest
where IP practice in the life sciences may be
heading in the coming years.
Controversy and change
In the United States, the standards that govern
which inventions can be patented have shifted
dramatically over the past 20 years. In the
1990s, these standards were quite liberal, and
patent lawyers routinely filed broad claims on
what might have been considered unpatentable basic research. But as patents proliferated,
they raised the specter of onerous and costly
licensing negotiations for downstream innovators1. Such ‘anti-commons’ concerns led the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to
ultimately narrow, or even reject, the broadest or most speculative claims on early-stage
research2.
More recently, two additional areas have
generated controversy: patents on diagnostic
testing and so-called secondary patents on the
small-molecule chemical therapies approved by
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
As to the former, critics have claimed that costs
outweigh benefits: that such patents pose undue
impediments to patient, physician and scientist
autonomy as well as patient access3. On the latArti K. Rai is at the Center for Innovation
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The US Supreme Court has handed down several decisions in recent years that have eroded the
strength of life science patents.

ter, critics have charged that biopharmaceutical firms are using patents to develop not new
chemical compositions but trivial improvements to already approved drugs. On this view,
‘secondary patents’ serve to perpetually ‘evergreen’ market exclusivity for certain drugs4.
Indeed, objections to secondary patents were
a major point of contention during the recent
negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement5. Such objections also formed the
basis for the Indian Supreme Court’s rejection
of Novartis’s (Basel, Switzerland) patent on a
derivative of Gleevec (imatinib mesylate), a
leukemia and gastrointestinal stromal tumor
therapy6.
Life science patent controversies have also
caught the attention of the US Supreme Court.
The vast literature decrying persistent problems of vagueness and overbreadth in software
and business method patents7 appears to have
influenced the Supreme Court’s decision making. The Court’s unanimous 2012 decision

in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories8 rejected patent claims on adjusting the dosage of a thiopurine drug based on
measuring the drug’s metabolite levels. In
rejecting those claims, the Supreme Court
relied on cases involving software, among other
technologies, to reach a sweeping holding that
patent claims encompassing “laws of nature”
are illegitimate unless they contain an additional “inventive step.” Similarly, the Supreme
Court’s unanimous 2013 decision in Association
of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics9
famously rejected all patent claims directed
to isolated genomic DNA. There, the Court
cited trans-technological concerns about patenting information, holding that patent claims
encompassing “products of nature” were invalid
unless “markedly different” from their natural
counterparts.
These Supreme Court decisions stressed
policy concerns that broad patents on foundational research may unduly impede follow-on
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innovation. Unfortunately, however, the decisions are widely viewed as having failed to
explicitly integrate these policy concerns into
workable legal tests. Because the claims at issue
in the Mayo case were quite narrow, for example, the case likely undermines many existing
diagnostic patents—both broad and narrow.
The challenge to diagnostic patents has been
exacerbated by a recent decision of the US
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Ariosa
Diagnostics v. Sequenom10. In that decision, the
court read Mayo as requiring it to invalidate
patent claims covering a pioneering, noninvasive, prenatal genetic testing technology.
Several judges have since voiced their concern
about the impact of Mayo and other decisions
on life sciences R&D.
Evolving business practices
In other instances, evolving business practices
have caused decision makers to rethink the
limits of patents. In its 2013 decision in Federal
Trade Commission v. Actavis11, for example, the
US Supreme Court struck down agreements in
which pioneer biopharmaceutical firms settle
generic patent challenges by paying substantial sums to the challenger. These agreements,
the Court concluded, were anticompetitive
under antitrust law, despite the patent protections surrounding the challenged drugs.
Importantly, most of the prohibited settlements
have involved secondary patents4.
The US Congress has also responded to
evolving business practices. In recognition
of the international nature of patent protection, the procedural changes implemented by
the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(AIA) have largely harmonized US law on
patent priority with other jurisdictions12. In
a partial recognition of the increased costs of
patent litigation, the AIA also created a robust
administrative apparatus for challenging patent validity, the Patent Trial and Appeals Board
(PTAB). The most controversial patent validity
challenges at the PTAB have involved the life
sciences: challenges to patents on biopharma-

ceuticals brought not by generic manufacturers
but by hedge funds that short the patent owner’s stock13. Here, too, patent law and policy
have not stood still. Numerous legislative bills
have been proposed to address these, and other,
unintended consequences of the ever-shifting
patent landscape14.

which a test measures the presence or absence
of a particular condition17. With the FDA now
planning to apply its premarket review system
for medical devices to at least some LDTs18, the
capital investment—and number of patents—
required to bring those tests to market is likely
to increase substantially.

The centrality of nonpatent regulation
For both small molecules and diagnostics, a
critical but often overlooked innovation policy lever has been nonpatent regulation. For
small molecules, nonpatent regulation has
worked synergistically with patents. A key
reason patents, including secondary patents,
have proved to be valuable is the strong linkage between patent law and FDA approval, a
feature of the regulatory landscape since the
1984 Hatch-Waxman Act. As a consequence,
any patent that a developer asserts is relevant
to its approved product can be used to delay the
regulatory approval of generics15. The relative
importance of patents is further enhanced by
the Hatch-Waxman Act’s allowance for generic
firms to rely on a developer’s clinical trial data
if the generics can demonstrate ‘bioequivalence’ to the original drug—studies that cost
as little as a million dollars16. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, empirical research indicates
that the number of patents per drug for the
cohort of drugs approved between 2000 and
2002 was roughly double that for the cohort
of drugs approved around 1984, the year the
Hatch-Waxman Act was passed4.
Conversely, a major reason patents have
historically been less necessary for diagnostics
than for therapeutics is the absence of mandatory FDA premarket approval. Although some
diagnostic manufacturers of stand-alone kits
have been required to seek FDA approval,
laboratory-developed tests (LDTs) have been
regulated only by the US Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services under the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments
(CLIA). CLIA’s regulations assess only the
test’s analytical validity, not the accuracy with

The future
The pattern of constant change to the patent
landscape may augur well for some life science
technologies, but less so for others. Changes in
patenting practice and law outside the United
States have also affected technology, such as
human embryonic stem cells (Box 1).
Going forward, the outlook for smallmolecule therapeutics appears challenging.
Although the USPTO has interpreted Myriad
narrowly by allowing patent claims to naturally derived molecules so long as they possess different functions19, the extent to which
courts will agree with the USPTO is unclear.
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Actavis limits the ability of small-molecule
innovators to use secondary patents and
reverse-payment settlements to evergreen their
franchises.
Another potential threat, particularly for
secondary patents, is the increasing frequency
with which these patents are being challenged at the PTAB. Since the procedures were
adopted in 2012, there have been almost 170
challenges to small-molecule drug patents
through these avenues14. All of these changes
are occurring against a background in which
the R&D cost associated with bringing new
drugs to market has increased20. The net consequence may be that small-molecule drugs
with modest potential consumer markets may
not be worth commercializing unless they are
given extra regulatory protection. Many brand
drug developers have already encountered difficulties in charging high-premium prices in
markets outside of the United States (Box 2).
Although prospects for small-molecule
drugs have diminished, those for biologics
may have risen. Although R&D costs associated with bringing biologics to market have
increased, and even though biologics patents
may be vulnerable under Myriad, biologics are
buffered from competition by several layers of
protection independent of patents. Historically,
a major buffer has been the absence of any
generic pathway. And even though a 2010
law, the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act (BPCIA)21, provides a limited “biosimilar” pathway to rely on pioneer’s
clinical trial data, the BPCIA still appears quite
burdensome for follow-on manufacturers. In
addition, biologics are generally much more
difficult to both manufacture and characterize

Box 1 Beyond US borders
Because the US represents the largest market for life science products, rapid
developments in US patent law are very important. At the same time, the law of other
jurisdictions has also evolved considerably. In Europe, for example, much of this
evolution has been driven by concerns about patents that are seen as contrary to public
morality. The European Biotechnology Directive 98/44 prohibits patents seen as contrary
to “public order” or morality, and specifically includes in this category patents on
processes for cloning human beings, modifying the human germ line, and using human
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes. In 2011, the European Court of Justice
(CJEU) interpreted this directive to ban patents involving stem cells created through the
destruction of human embryos25. But a 2014 CJEU decision partially narrowed the scope
of the 2011 ban so as to exclude stem cells created through parthenogenesis26.
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In the United States, patent owners typically have no affirmative obligation to license their
patents. Although the US government may use unlicensed patents if it compensates the
patent owner27, it has rarely used this power for life science patents. And even when the
federal government itself funds the patented research, and could therefore—in theory—
“march in” and require patent holders to license their inventions, this has yet to occur in
practice28. Internationally, however, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement allows its signatories to enact legislation permitting compulsory patent
licenses in certain circumstances. Thailand, Brazil and India, among others, have issued
compulsory license orders. Moreover, even the mere threat of compulsory licenses has
encouraged pharmaceutical developers to lower their prices in response29. How different
emerging economies will address the dual challenges of providing drug access to their
populations and building life science innovation sectors remains to be seen.

analytically than small molecules. Developers
guard manufacturing information very closely
as a trade secret, and FDA guidance under the
BPCIA not only requires biosimilar manufacturers to attempt to reverse engineer such processes—at great cost—but to conduct, at least
partially, some of their own clinical trials. A
follow-on approval process that costs hundreds
of millions of dollars creates an obvious barrier to entry22. But even if FDA were to relax
its regulatory standards, originator biologics
manufacturers would still enjoy better market
exclusivity than their small-molecule counterparts: a separate 12-year regulatory exclusivity
period, 7 years longer than that provided to
new chemical entities of small-molecule drugs.
Diagnostic testing firms, meanwhile, were
once able to rely upon both patents and trade
secrecy for protection. Although patents and
trade secrecy over the same inventive territory
arguably challenged the public policy goal of
promoting disclosure, simultaneous reliance
on both of these regimes was not uncommon23.
With patents now in doubt, diagnostic firms
may rely even more heavily on secrecy.
Secrecy in the area of diagnostics has engendered concern at the FDA. In the context of its
general determination that it should now regulate LDTs, the FDA has emphasized the need
for regulatory review of the nontransparent,
“complex” algorithms on which many modern
LDTs are based18. The FDA is not alone in its
concern. The agency’s work in this area fol-
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lows a prominent Institute of Medicine (IOM)
report, issued in 2012, recommending the
FDA ‘develop and finalize a risk-based guidance or regulation on bringing omics-based
tests to FDA for review’24.
To be sure, FDA review—and regulatory
exclusivities—can readily co-exist with trade
secrecy. Indeed, at least for larger firms in the
LDT space, trade secrecy combined with high
regulatory barriers that hamper competition
may represent a very attractive combination.
But certain commentators have gone further,
calling for greater transparency in data and
analyses associated with biopharmaceutical innovation. They have emphasized the
innovation-related benefits that could accrue
from pooling many different types of biological data previously held in trade secret siloes
and making these data more widely available to researchers23. How tensions between
open science and trade secrecy will play out
remains to be seen, and will likely depend
heavily on trends in public funding of open
data initiatives.
Conclusions
Over the past 20 years, the patent structure
surrounding life science innovation has
changed substantially. If current trends continue, the future is likely to be one of diminishing returns to patents. In some cases,
alternative incentive structures could be
friendlier to larger firms than smaller firms.

Regardless, 20 years from now, when Nature
Biotechnology celebrates 40 years of publication, others may be writing a similar article
about trade secrets and regulatory exclusivities—rather than patents.
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